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 Tenet Healthcare Corporation, along with two of its 
subsidiaries, appeals from the District Court’s denial without 
prejudice of its motion to compel arbitration.  The central 
issue is whether the District Court erred in finding genuine 
disputes of material fact that might render the arbitration 
agreement unconscionable and unenforceable.  Finding no 
such disputes, we will reverse. 
I. 
 Plaintiff and Appellee Janice Quilloin (“Quilloin”) is a 
registered nurse with an associate’s degree, who began 
working at Hahnemann University Hospital in October of 
2006.  In February 2008, Quilloin resigned to take another 
job.  Later that year, she reapplied for a position at 
Hahnemann, and was rehired in December 2008.  She 
continued working at Hahnemann until November 2009.  
Hahnemann University Hospital is owned by Tenet 
HealthSystem Hahnemann, LLC and managed by Tenet 
HealthSystem Philadelphia, both subsidiaries of Tenet 
Healthcare Corporation, a health care services company with 
subsidiaries operating 55 hospitals with over 14,000 beds, as 
of December 31, 2008.  Tenet Healthcare Corporation, Tenet 
HealthSystem Hahnemann, LLC and Tenet HealthSystem 
Philadelphia (collectively “Tenet”), are all Defendants and 
Appellants in the present action. 
 On or around the time that Quilloin began her 
employment, both on October 9, 2006 and on January 5, 
2009, she signed the “Employee Acknowledgment” form, 
which acknowledged receipt of the “Fair Treatment Process” 
brochure (“FTP”).  Quilloin at first claimed that she did not 
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sign a form in October 2006, but only signed in January 2009.  
However, when Tenet subsequently produced an “Employee 
Acknowledgement” form signed by Janice Quilloin on 
October 9, 2006, Quilloin filed a supplemental submission 
“‘acknowledging signing that document’ but emphasizing her 
‘lack of recall’ of that act.”  Quilloin v. Tenet HealthSystem 
Philadelphia, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 2d 707, 712 n.4 (E.D. Pa. 
2011).  Quilloin does not now dispute that she signed the 
Employment Acknowledgement or whether she received the 
FTP. 
 Quilloin alleges that she was not informed that she 
would have to commit to arbitration in order to be employed 
by Tenet.  She also alleges that when she was rehired, she did 
not remember being previously required to sign the 
“Employee Acknowledgement” form, and thus, was not 
expecting to sign it a second time. 
 The “Employee Acknowledgment” forms that Quilloin 
signed are only one page long.  Although a few words were 
altered between 2006 and 2009, the differences are minor and 
not material to this case.  Following three paragraphs 
regarding the employee handbook and standard of conduct, 
the 2009 Employee Acknowledgement reads: 
“I acknowledge that I have received a copy of 
the Tenet Fair Treatment Process brochure. . . .  
I hereby voluntarily agree to use the Company’s 
Fair Treatment Process and to submit to final 
and binding arbitration any and all claims and 
disputes except ‘Excluded Issues’ that are 
related in any way to my employment or the 
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termination of my employment with Tenet.  I 
understand that final and binding arbitration 
will be the sole and exclusive remedy for any 
such claim or dispute against Tenet or its 
parent, subsidiary or affiliated companies or 
entities, and each of its and/or their employees, 
officers, directors or agents, and that, by 
agreeing to use arbitration to resolve my 
dispute, both the Company and I agree to forego 
any right we each may have had to a jury trial 
on issues covered by the Fair Treatment 
Process.  I also agree that such arbitration will 
be conducted before an experienced arbitrator 
chosen by me and the Company, and will be 
conducted under the Federal Arbitration Act 
and the procedural rules of the American 
Arbitration Association (‘AAA’). 
I further acknowledge that in exchange for my 
agreement to arbitrate, the Company also agrees 
to submit all claims and disputes it may have 
with me to final and binding arbitration, and 
that the Company further agrees that if I submit 
a request for binding arbitration, my maximum 
out-of-pocket expenses for the arbitrator and the 
administrative costs of the AAA will be an 
amount equal to one day’s pay (if I am an 
exempt employee) or eight times my hourly rate 
of pay (if I am a non-exempt employee), and 
that the Company will pay all of the remaining 
fees and administrative costs of the arbitrator 
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and the AAA.  I further acknowledge that this 
mutual agreement to arbitrate may not be 
modified or rescinded except by a written 
agreement signed by both me and the 
Company.” 
 The FTP brochure outlines the internal grievance 
process culminating in arbitration, as well as the parameters 
of the arbitration agreement itself.  The FTP does not state 
that claims regarding the validity of the arbitration agreement 
itself must be arbitrated.  Under “Application and Coverage” 
the brochure states that “[t]he FTP . . . covers all disputes 
relating to or arising out of an employee’s employment with 
the company or the termination of employment. . . . [except 
for] those listed in the ‘Exclusions and Restrictions’ 
section[.]”  Notably, neither party argues that one of the 
enumerated exclusions or restrictions is applicable here. 
 The FTP outlines the steps employees are required to 
follow to resolve disputes, and explains approximately how 
long Tenet would take to respond to each step in the process: 
1. “Submit Dispute to Supervisor[,]” who 
will “respond . . . as soon as possible, 
usually within seven calendar days from 
the date you raised the issue” 
2. “Appeal Supervisor’s Decision to 
Department Head[,]” who will 
“respon[d] . . . as soon as possible, 
usually within seven calendar days of the 
date the Department Head receives your 
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completed FTP Dispute Resolution 
Form” 
3. “Appeal Department Head’s Decision to 
Administration[,]” which will “respon[d] 
. . . as soon as possible, usually within 
seven calendar days of the date you 
request review under Step 3” 
4. “Appeal administration’s decision to FTP 
Committee[,]” which will “meet as soon 
as possible, usually within 30 days of 
your request. . . . [and] promptly . . . 
decide the issue(s)” 
5. “Final and Binding Arbitration” 
A limitations clause states that “[a]ny request for arbitration 
under the FTP must be made within one year after the event 
giving rise to the dispute. . . . [or], if a longer limitations 
period is provided by a statute governing your claim, then 
your claim will be subject to the longer limitations period 
provided by the statute.” 
 The FTP also includes provisions for fees and 
remedies.  In one clause, the FTP states that “[y]ou and the 
company will be responsible for the fees and costs of your 
own respective legal counsel, if any, and any other expenses 
and costs, such as costs associated with witnesses or 
obtaining copies of hearing transcripts.”  In another provision, 
entitled “Authority of Arbitrator,” the FTP states that “[t]he 
arbitrator has the authority to award any remedy that would 
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have been available to you had you litigated the dispute in 
court under applicable law.”  Elsewhere, the FTP states that 
“no remedies that otherwise would be available to you or the 
company in a court of law will be forfeited by virtue of the 
agreement to use and be bound by the FTP.” 
 On December 4, 2009, Quilloin filed suit in the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 
asserting a collective action against Tenet under the Fair 
Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19, as well as 
several state-based class action and common law claims.1
 On June 10, 2010, Tenet filed a motion to compel 
compliance with the agreement to arbitrate.
  See 
Quilloin, 763 F. Supp. 2d at 711.  In its Answer filed on 
February 19, 2010, Tenet asserted the existence of an 
arbitration agreement as an affirmative defense. 
2
                                              
1 The details of this underlying action are not relevant 
to the claims we are asked to examine on appeal, which solely 
address the denial of a motion to compel arbitration. 
2 Technically, Tenet filed a motion to dismiss, or, in 
the alternative, to stay proceedings and compel compliance 
with the agreement to arbitrate; however, as the District Court 
noted, “a stay, rather than a dismissal, is the required course 
of action when compelling arbitration.”  Quilloin v. Tenet 
HealthSystem Philadelphia, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 2d 707, 711 
n.2 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (citing Lloyd v. HOVENSA, LLC, 369 
F.3d 263, 269 (3d Cir. 2004). 
  On July 2, 2010, 
Quilloin responded, claiming, among other things, that the 
 
9 
agreement to arbitrate was unconscionable.  Quilloin did not 
file a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment.3
 The District Court issued an order on January 20, 
2011, see id. at 735, finding that genuine disputes of material 
fact remained as to whether the arbitration agreement was 
enforceable,
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3 We note this here because on appeal, Quilloin asks 
that we affirm the District Court’s denial of the order, or in 
the alternative, that we find the arbitration agreement 
unconscionable and unenforceable as a matter of law.  We 
have no such alternative.  Only “final decisions of the district 
courts” are appealable,  28 U.S.C. § 1291, and because 
Quilloin neither filed nor claims to have filed a motion to 
dismiss or for summary judgment, the District Court issued 
no corresponding order.  Thus, we cannot now find that 
Quilloin is entitled to a judgment finding the agreement 
unenforceable as a matter of law.  See also 9 U.S.C. § 16 
(discussing the appealability of arbitration decisions).  At 
most, we would have the authority to affirm the district 
court’s finding that a genuine dispute of material fact 
remained. 
4 Technically, the District Court found that genuine 
“issues” of material fact remained.  See Quilloin, 763 F. 
Supp. 2d at 735.  However, in 2010, the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure were amended, and the wording for the 
summary judgment standard was changed to require review 
for genuine “dispute[s]” of material fact.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(a). 
 and denying the motion to compel.  On 
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February 9, 2011, Tenet filed a timely notice of appeal, 
commencing the present action. 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction over this case 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have jurisdiction under 9 
U.S.C. § 16 to review the District Court’s order denying a 
motion to compel arbitration. 
 Our jurisdiction is not affected by the fact that the 
order was denied without prejudice.  The Federal Arbitration 
Act (“FAA”) clearly “provides for interlocutory appeals from 
a District Court’s refusal to compel arbitration” regardless of 
whether the appeal is from a final decision.  Sandvik AB v. 
Advent Int’l Corp., 220 F.3d 99, 102-03 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(construing the FAA, as codified at 9 U.S.C. § 16).  In 
Sandvik, the district court denied a motion to compel 
arbitration, “conclud[ing] that it could not order arbitration 
until it determined the validity of the underlying contract.”  
220 F.3d at 102.  Sandvik challenged our jurisdiction, 
claiming that the “refusal to order arbitration was not final[.]”  
Id.  However, we held that “[t]he language of [9 U.S.C.] § 16 
provides for appeals of orders denying arbitration, and it 
makes no distinction between orders denying arbitration and 
‘final orders’ that accomplish the same end.”  Id.  The 
structure of Section 16 is consistent with this interpretation, 
because otherwise, “the provision providing for appeals from 
denials of orders to arbitrate [under § 16(a)(1)] would become 
surplusage in light of the more expansive language in § 
16(a)(3) [providing for appeals from final decisions with 
respect to arbitration].”  Id. at 103.  Finally, we found it 
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significant “that Congress decided to use the word ‘final’ in 
one part of the statute, but declined to do so in the section that 
declares that orders denying motions to compel arbitration are 
indeed appealable.”  Id.  Under Sandvik, there can be no 
doubt that we have the authority to review an appeal from the 
District Court’s order denying a motion to compel arbitration, 
irrespective of the fact that the order was denied without 
prejudice. 
 “We exercise plenary review over questions regarding 
the validity and enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate.”  
Puleo v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 605 F.3d 172, 177 (3d Cir. 
2010).  Specifically, motions to compel arbitration are 
reviewed under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
summary judgment standard, Par-Knit Mills, Inc. v. 
Stockbridge Fabrics Co., 636 F.2d 51, 54 & n.9 (3d Cir. 
1980), permitting judgment where “there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  
Furthermore, “[i]n reviewing the record, we are required to 
view the facts and draw inferences in the light most favorable 
to the nonmoving party.”  Ray v. Twp. of Warren, 626 F.3d 
170, 173 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). 
III. 
A. 
 Tenet argues as a threshold matter that the District 
Court erred in considering Quilloin’s claim that the 
arbitration agreement was unconscionable, because Quilloin 
failed to direct her challenge at a specific clause within the 
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arbitration agreement.  Essentially, Tenet claims that without 
a challenge to some specific clause, the District Court may 
not inquire into issues of arbitrability.  We disagree. 
 “Because this is a question of arbitrability, it is 
governed by the [FAA].”  Khan v. Dell Inc., No. 10-3655, 
2012 WL 163899, at *4 (3d Cir. Jan. 20, 2012) (citing Puleo, 
605 F.3d at 180).  The FAA manifests “a congressional 
declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration 
agreements . . . .”  Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury 
Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).  However, questions of 
arbitrability, including challenges to an arbitration 
agreement’s validity, are presumed to be questions for 
judicial determination.  Puleo, 605 F.3d at 178 (quoting 
Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 
(2002)).  “Courts should not assume that the parties agreed to 
arbitrate arbitrability unless there is ‘clea[r] and 
unmistakabl[e]’ evidence that they did so.”  First Options of 
Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995) (quoting 
AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 649 
(1986)).  This is because the FAA places arbitration 
agreements on “an equal footing with other contracts” and 
thus, like any other contract, a plaintiff may bring a challenge 
to court claiming that an agreement to arbitrate is 
unenforceable based on any of the “generally applicable 
contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability 
. . . .”  AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 
1745-46 (2011) (construing the FAA as codified at 9 U.S.C. 
§ 2) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 On the other hand, a challenge to “the validity of the 
contract as a whole, as opposed to the arbitration clause in 
 
13 
particular, does not present a question of arbitrability.”  
Puleo, 605 F.3d at 180 n.4 (citing Buckeye Check Cashing, 
Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445-46 (2006)); accord Rent-
A-Center v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2778 (2010).  This is 
because regardless of whether a contract as a whole is valid, 
agreements to arbitrate are severable from a larger contract, 
and may therefore be separately enforced and their validity 
separately determined.  Rent-A-Center, 130 S. Ct. at 2778.  
Thus, in order to qualify as a question of arbitrability that the 
court may consider, the challenge must “relat[e] to the 
making and performance of the agreement to arbitrate.”  
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 
395, 404 (1967). 
 In Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, the Supreme 
Court found that the plaintiff failed to challenge the validity 
of the arbitration agreement at issue.  The contract containing 
the general agreement to arbitrate disputes also contained a 
specific agreement to arbitrate questions of arbitrability.  130 
S. Ct. at 2777.  To eliminate the confusion caused by an 
agreement to arbitrate nested within another agreement to 
arbitrate, the Rent-A-Center Court found it necessary to 
distinguish between the overall arbitration agreement (the 
“contract”), and the agreement to arbitrate arbitrability (the 
“delegation clause”).  Id. at 2778-79.  The problem was that 
the plaintiff “challenged only the validity of the contract as a 
whole” rather than the validity of the delegation clause.  Id. at 
2779.  Because the delegation clause was severable from the 
contract, it was unaffected by the contract’s validity; thus, the 
Supreme Court held that in accordance with the valid 
delegation clause, questions of arbitrability (including the 
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arbitrability of the overall agreement to arbitrate) must go to 
an arbitrator.  Id. at 2778-79. 
 Tenet argues that, like the plaintiff in Rent-A-Center, 
Quilloin should have challenged some specific clause within 
the FTP and Employee Acknowledgement, rather than 
challenging the arbitration agreement as a whole.  However, 
Rent-A-Center is inapposite.  First, it is important to note that 
unlike the agreement in Rent-A-Center, the FTP and 
Employee Acknowledgement constitute an agreement to 
arbitrate employment issues generally; they do not purport to 
contain an agreement to arbitrate arbitrability.  Cf. Rent-A-
Center, 130 S. Ct. at 2777.  Because the parties have not 
indicated otherwise, the question of arbitrability is one for the 
court.  See Puleo, 605 F.3d at 178. 
 Additionally, Rent-A-Center did not require Quilloin to 
challenge a specific clause.  In Rent-A-Center, identification 
of a specific clause was necessary merely because there were 
two arbitration agreements, and the one at issue (the 
agreement to arbitrate arbitrability) was specifically located 
within the “delegation clause.”  Here, unlike the contract in 
Rent-A-Center, the FTP and Employee Acknowledgement 
contained only one agreement to arbitrate.  There was no need 
to distinguish between multiple agreements to arbitrate; all 
that Quilloin needed to do was challenge the validity of the 
only agreement to arbitrate.  See Rent-A-Center, 130 S. Ct. at 
2778; Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 404. 
 Because Quilloin did not agree to arbitrate the issue of 
arbitrability, and because she claims that the arbitration 
agreement, specifically, is unconscionable, the District Court 
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did not err in addressing the validity of the agreement to 
arbitrate.  Thus, we turn to the merits of Quilloin’s claims to 
determine whether the District Court properly denied Tenet’s 
motion to compel arbitration. 
B. 
 We generally apply state contract principles to 
determine whether an arbitration agreement is 
unconscionable.  Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1746 (construing 
the FAA, as codified at 9 U.S.C. § 2).  However, the FAA 
preempts conflicting state rules that either prohibit arbitration 
outright, id. at 1747, or that “stand[] as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and 
objectives of Congress . . . .”  Id. at 1753 (quoting Hines v. 
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).  Thus, in determining 
unconscionability, we must use principles of Pennsylvania 
law, to the extent that such law is not displaced by the FAA. 
 To prove unconscionability under Pennsylvania law, a 
party must show that the contract was both substantively and 
procedurally unconscionable.  Salley v. Option One Mortg. 
Corp., 925 A.2d 115, 119 (Pa. 2007).  In examining these two 
prongs, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has indicated that it 
might be appropriate to use a “sliding-scale approach” so that 
“where the procedural unconscionability is very high, a lesser 
degree of substantive unconscionability may be required” and 
presumably, vice-versa.  Id. at 125 & n.12.  We turn first to 
the District Court’s finding that the arbitration agreement 
might be substantively unconscionable. 
 1. Substantive Unconscionability 
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A contract or provision is substantively 
unconscionable where it “unreasonably favors the party 
asserting it.”  Salley, 925 A.2d at 119.  Put another way, 
“[s]ubstantive unconscionability refers to contractual terms 
that are unreasonably or grossly favorable to one side and to 
which the disfavored party does not assent.”  Harris v. Green 
Tree Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing 
Germantown Mfg. Co. v. Rawlinson, 491 A.2d 138, 145-47 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1985); Denlinger, Inc. v. Dendler, 608 A.2d 
1061, 1068 (1992)).  An arbitration agreement cannot be 
construed as substantively unconscionable where it “does not 
alter or limit the rights and remedies available to [a] party in 
the arbitral forum . . . .”  Edwards v. HOVENSA, LLC, 497 
F.3d 355, 364 (3d Cir. 2007) (construing Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991)). 
 In denying Tenet’s motion to compel arbitration, the 
District Court found three bases on which the arbitration 
agreement might be substantively unconscionable:  (1) a 
potential prohibition against recovery of attorneys’ fees and 
costs, (2) potential inclusion of a class action waiver, and (3) 
the possibility that Tenet could “run out the clock” on the 
statute of limitations.  We disagree with the District Court’s 
conclusions, and find no basis for substantive 
unconscionability. 
 a. Attorneys’ Fees 
 Provisions requiring parties to be responsible for their 
own expenses, including attorneys’ fees, are generally 
unconscionable because restrictions on attorneys’ fees 
conflict with federal statutes providing fee-shifting as a 
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remedy.  See Spinetti v. Serv. Corp. Int’l, 324 F.3d 212, 
216 (3d Cir. 2003) (Where called for by statute, “arbitrators 
. . . must ordinarily grant attorney fees to prevailing claimants 
rather than be restricted by private contractual language.” 
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted)); accord Nino 
v. Jewelry Exch., Inc., 609 F.3d 191, 203 (3d Cir. 2010); 
Alexander v. Anthony Int’l, L.P., 341 F.3d 256, 267 (3d Cir. 
2003); Parilla v. IAP Worldwide Servs., VI, Inc., 368 F.3d 
269, 278-79 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 Tenet and Quilloin dispute whether the arbitration 
agreement allows the prevailing party to recover attorneys’ 
fees.  The agreement contains no clear prohibition against 
fee-shifting; the District Court wrote that “it is unclear 
whether the contract deprives employees of the right to 
recover attorney’s fees and costs.”  Quilloin, 763 F. Supp. 2d 
at 725.  In one clause, the FTP states that “[y]ou and the 
company will be responsible for the fees and costs of your 
own respective legal counsel, if any, and any other expenses 
and costs, such as costs associated with witnesses or 
obtaining copies of hearing transcripts.”  However, another 
provision in the FTP could be read as giving the arbitrator 
authority to grant attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party:  
“Authority of Arbitrator:  The arbitrator has the authority to 
award any remedy that would have been available to you had 
you litigated the dispute in court under applicable law.”  It 
also states that “no remedies that otherwise would be 
available to you or the company in a court of law will be 
forfeited by virtue of the agreement to use and be bound by 
the FTP.” 
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 We agree with the District Court that the arbitration 
agreement is ambiguous regarding the award of attorneys’ 
fees, but find that the District Court erred in determining that 
it could not compel arbitration before resolving the issue.  
The Supreme Court has clearly established that ambiguities in 
arbitration agreements must be interpreted by the arbitrator.  
PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401, 406-07 
(2003); accord Puleo, 605 F.3d at 179.  It explained that “we 
should not, on the basis of mere speculation that an arbitrator 
might interpret . . . ambiguous agreements in a manner that 
casts their enforceability into doubt, take upon ourselves the 
authority to decide the antecedent question of how the 
ambiguity is to be resolved.”  PacifiCare, 538 U.S. at 406-07 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
Alabama State Fed’n of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450, 461 
(1945) (“It has long been [our] considered practice not to 
decide abstract, hypothetical or contingent questions . . . .”). 
 In PacifiCare Health Systems v. Book, respondents 
challenged the enforceability of arbitration agreements on the 
basis that the agreements could “be construed to limit the 
arbitrator’s authority to award damages . . . .”  538 U.S. at 
402.  The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh 
Circuit denied petitioners’ requests to compel arbitration, on 
the basis that this potential limitation rendered the arbitration 
agreements unenforceable.  Id. at 403.  The Supreme Court 
reversed, noting that such a “preliminary question” is not 
truly a question of arbitrability for the court to decide, id. at 
407 n.2, and holding that “since we do not know how the 
arbitrator will construe the remedial limitations, the questions 
whether they render the parties’ agreements unenforceable 
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and whether it is for courts or arbitrators to decide 
enforceability in the first instance are unusually abstract.”  Id. 
at 407.  Rather than speculate as to whether a certain 
interpretation of an ambiguity might render an arbitration 
agreement unenforceable, “the proper course [in such a case] 
is to compel arbitration.”  Id. 
 The issue presented here is virtually indistinguishable 
from the issue in PacifiCare.  Like the PacifiCare 
respondents, Quilloin challenges the enforceability of the 
arbitration agreement based on speculation that the agreement 
might be interpreted to limit the arbitrator’s authority to 
fashion a remedy.  Quilloin’s claim would require the District 
Court to decide a “preliminary question” before addressing 
the issue of unconscionability, and as PacifiCare noted, such 
a “preliminary question” is not truly a question of 
arbitrability.  Id. at 407 n.2.  Under PacifiCare, we are 
required to find that the ambiguity regarding attorneys’ fees is 
a question for the arbitrator. 
 b. Class Action Waiver 
 Under Pennsylvania law, class action waivers are 
substantively unconscionable where “class action litigation is 
the only effective remedy” such as when “the high cost of 
arbitration compared with the minimal potential value of 
individual damages denie[s] every plaintiff a meaningful 
remedy.”  Thibodeau v. Comcast Corp., 912 A.2d 874, 883-
84 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006). 
 Here, the arbitration agreement does not contain an 
express class action waiver.  Silence regarding class 
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arbitration generally indicates a prohibition against class 
arbitration, but the actual determination as to whether class 
action is prohibited is a question of interpretation and 
procedure for the arbitrator.  Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. 
AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1775 (2010).  The 
District Court acknowledged that the determination was for 
the arbitrator, but proceeded to analyze whether a class action 
waiver would render the arbitration agreement substantively 
unconscionable, if the arbitrator were to determine that the 
agreement contained such a waiver.  Quilloin, 763 F. Supp. 
2d at 727 & n.22. 
 As with the issue of attorneys’ fees, the District Court 
erred in addressing the hypothetical situation that might or 
might not arise depending on the arbitrator’s interpretation of 
the arbitration agreement.  See PacifiCare, 538 U.S. at 406-
07.  Furthermore, even if the agreement explicitly waived 
Quilloin’s right to pursue class actions, the Pennsylvania law 
prohibiting class action waivers is surely preempted by the 
FAA under Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1740. 
 After the District Court denied Tenet’s motion to 
compel, the Supreme Court ruled in Concepcion that a 
California law deeming certain class action waivers to be 
unconscionable was an “obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution” of the FAA, and was therefore “inconsistent with” 
and preempted by the FAA.  131 S. Ct. at 1750-51, 1753.  
Specifically, the Concepcion Court found that “[a]rbitration is 
poorly suited to the higher stakes of class litigation” because:  
(1) “the switch from bilateral to class arbitration sacrifices the 
principal advantage of arbitration—its informality[,]” (2) it is 
“at the very least odd to think that an arbitrator would be 
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entrusted with ensuring that third parties’ due process rights 
are satisfied[,]” and (3) “class arbitration greatly increases 
risks to defendants.”  Id. at 1751-52.  California’s law did not 
deem class action waivers to be per se unconscionable, but 
was based in part on the reasoning that “class proceedings are 
necessary to prosecute small-dollar claims that might 
otherwise slip through the legal system.”  Id. at 1753.  The 
Supreme Court dismissed this reasoning, ruling that “States 
cannot require a procedure that is inconsistent with the FAA, 
even if it is desirable for unrelated reasons.”  Id. 
 Following and relying on Concepcion, we found a 
similar New Jersey law to be preempted.  The New Jersey 
law held that “a waiver of class-wide dispute resolution 
would be improper in the context of either litigation or 
arbitration[,]” and unconscionability thus “provide[d] a 
defense against ‘all waivers of class-wide actions, not simply 
those that also compel arbitration[.]’”  Litman v. Cellco 
P’ship, 655 F.3d 225, 229 (3d Cir. 2011) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted) (construing Muhammad v. 
County Bank of Rehoboth Beach, 912 A.2d 88 (N.J. 2006)).  
Our Litman ruling is directly applicable here: 
“We understand the holding of Concepcion to 
be both broad and clear:  a state law that seeks 
to impose class arbitration despite a contractual 
agreement for individualized arbitration is 
inconsistent with, and therefore preempted by, 
the FAA, irrespective of whether class 
arbitration is desirable for unrelated reasons.” 
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Litman, 655 F.3d at 231 (internal citation and quotation marks 
omitted). 
 The Pennsylvania law at issue here is clearly 
preempted under Concepcion and Litman.5
 Like the law in Litman, the Pennsylvania law “seeks to 
impose class arbitration despite a contractual agreement for 
individualized arbitration” and is therefore preempted.  See 
id. at 231.  In fact, the Pennsylvania law is even more 
egregious than the New Jersey law.  See Litman, 655 F.3d at 
229 n.5.  The New Jersey rule against class action waivers 
applied to litigation and arbitration alike, id. at 229, while 
  The Pennsylvania 
law is not substantively different from the California law, 
which is unquestionably preempted by the FAA.  Like the 
California law, Pennsylvania law does not render class action 
waivers per se unconscionable.  Rather, Pennsylvania finds 
such waivers substantively unconscionable where “class 
action litigation is the only effective remedy” such as when 
“the high cost of arbitration compared with the minimal 
potential value of individual damages denie[s] every plaintiff 
a meaningful remedy.”  Thibodeau, 912 A.2d at 883-84. 
                                              
5 On this, we agree with numerous district courts.  See 
Brown v. TrueBlue, Inc., No. 1:10-cv-0514, 2011 WL 
5869773, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 22, 2011); King v. Advance 
Am., Nos. 07-237, 07-3142, 2011 WL 3861898, at *5-6 (E.D. 
Pa. Aug. 31, 2011); Black v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., No. 
10-848, 2011 WL 3940236, at *70 n.25 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 25, 
2011); Clerk v. Cash Central of Utah, LLC, No. 09-4964, 
2011 WL 3739549, at *3-5 (E.D. Pa. Aug 25, 2011). 
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Pennsylvania law has often prohibited class action waivers 
based on their arbitration-specific context.  Id. at 229 n.5 
(citing Gay v. CreditInform, 511 F.3d 369, 395 (3d Cir. 
2007)).  Thus, the Pennsylvania law presents an even greater 
obstacle to the fulfillment of the FAA’s purposes than does 
the New Jersey law, because it is exactly the type of law that 
“single[s] out the provisions of arbitration agreements[,]” 
Harris, 183 F.3d at 183, and that “derive[s] [its] meaning 
from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue.”  
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1746. 
 c. Running Out the Clock 
 Finally, Quilloin claims that the arbitration agreement 
is unconscionable because it would permit Tenet to “run out 
the clock” on the statute of limitations.  The FTP requires 
employees to follow several internal steps and procedures 
before submitting a claim to arbitration; because the FTP only 
gives Tenet approximate time limits to respond to each step in 
the procedure, Quilloin argues that the FTP allows Tenet to 
delay until claims have expired under the statute of 
limitations. 
 Tenet first responds that any claim regarding the 
possibility for delay has been mooted because Quilloin tolled 
the statute of limitations by filing this claim.  Tenet contends 
that there is now no danger of delays running out the clock 
because Quilloin will be able to bring her claim through 
either arbitration or litigation with no danger of exceeding the 
statute of limitations. 
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 Mootness implicates our jurisdiction and is thus 
determined based on Article III justiciability principles.  St. 
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 537 
(1978); Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Lacey Twp., 772 
F.2d 1103, 1108 n.8 (3d Cir. 1985).  Under “Article III[,] 
judicial power extends only to actual cases and controversies” 
and “[a]n actual controversy must be extant at all stages of 
review . . . .”  Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2514 (2011) 
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
 Here, the controversy pertains to unconscionability 
under Pennsylvania law, which measures unconscionability at 
the time of the contract’s making.  13 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
§ 2302(a).  Although Tenet claims that the arbitration 
agreement’s provision for delay can no longer be 
unconscionable, it mistakenly measures unconscionability in 
the present moment, based on what has happened since the 
contract was signed, rather than based on whether the contract 
was unconscionable at the time of its formation.  Thus, the 
fact that Quilloin has tolled the statute of limitations in the 
present instance does not abrogate or in any way moot her 
claim that the contract was unconscionable at its formation. 
 Turning to the substance of the claim, time limitations 
in arbitration agreements are substantively unconscionable if 
they are “clearly unreasonable and unduly favorable” to the 
employer.  See Nino, 609 F.3d at 202 (quoting Alexander, 341 
F.3d at 266).  Quilloin contends that the time limits in Nino v. 
Jewelry Exchange, Inc., presented “the mirror image of the 
time limits” here.  However, we find Nino to be inapposite.  
In Nino, the employee was provided with only a five-day 
window within which to file and preserve a complaint, a 
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window which the court found substantively unconscionable 
because it was “clearly unreasonable . . . .”  609 F.3d at 202-
03 (quoting Alexander, 341 F.3d at 266); see also Alexander, 
341 F.3d at 266 (finding a time limit of thirty days to be 
“clearly unreasonable and unduly favorable” to the 
employer).  These cases involved “clearly unreasonable” time 
limits placed on the employee, rather than estimated time 
limits placed on the employer’s response.  Quilloin fails to 
explain how a process allowing an employee the full amount 
of time permitted under law is unconscionable, even if the 
employer is given guidelines, rather than strict parameters, 
within which it may respond. 
 Even if Tenet tried to delay and failed to move forward 
with proceedings within a reasonable time, Quilloin could 
have filed a motion to compel arbitration.  See, e.g., Allen v. 
Apollo Group, Inc., No. Civ.A.H-04-3041, 2004 WL 
3119918, at *9 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 9, 2004). 
 Given the existence of reasonable time guidelines for 
Tenet to act, paired with the fact that Tenet could not 
preclude Quilloin’s claim because she always had the option 
to motion to compel arbitration, the time guidelines are not 
“clearly unreasonable and unduly favorable” to Tenet.  See 
Nino, 609 F.3d at 202 (quoting Alexander, 341 F.3d at 266).  
We fail to see how, even considering the facts in the light 
most favorable to Quilloin, there is any genuine dispute of 
material fact regarding this claim of substantive 
unconscionability.  
 We find that Quilloin raised no genuine dispute of 
material fact regarding substantive unconscionability; 
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therefore, the District Court erred by denying Tenet’s motion 
to compel arbitration. 
 2. Procedural Unconscionability 
 Even if Quilloin had raised a genuine dispute of 
material fact as to substantive unconscionability, we would 
nonetheless find that the District Court erred in denying 
Tenet’s motion to compel arbitration because Quilloin did not 
raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the 
arbitration agreement was procedurally unconscionable.  
Quilloin argues that procedural unconscionability arises 
because she was not informed that she would have to commit 
to arbitrate disputes in order to be employed by Tenet, that no 
one explained to her the terms of the agreement, and that she 
had little time or choice but to accept its terms and sign. 
 A contract is procedurally unconscionable where 
“there was a lack of meaningful choice in the acceptance of 
the challenged provision[.]”  Salley, 925 A.2d at 119.  A 
contract will be deemed procedurally unconscionable when 
formed through “oppression and unfair surprise.”  Witmer v. 
Exxon Corp., 434 A.2d 1222, 1228 n.16 (Pa. 1981) (citation 
and quotation marks omitted).  Courts “should remain attuned 
to well-supported claims that the agreement to arbitrate 
resulted from the sort of fraud or overwhelming economic 
power that would provide grounds for the revocation of any 
contract.”  Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32-33 (internal citation and 
quotation marks omitted). 
 Under Pennsylvania law, a contract is generally 
considered to be procedurally unconscionable if it is a 
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contract of adhesion.  McNulty v. H&R Block, Inc., 843 A.2d 
1267, 1273 & n.6 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004); but cf. Salley, 925 
A.2d at 125-26; id. at 128 (suggesting that not all contracts of 
adhesion are procedurally unconscionable).  A contract of 
adhesion is a “standard-form contract prepared by one party, 
to be signed by the party in a weaker position, usually a 
consumer, who adheres to the contract with little choice about 
the terms.”  Chepkevich v. Hidden Valley Resort, L.P., 2 A.3d 
1174, 1190 (Pa. 2010) (internal citation and quotation marks 
omitted). 
 However, contracts cannot be deemed unconscionable 
“simply because of a disparity in bargaining power.”  Witmer, 
434 A.2d at 1228; accord Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32-33.  “[T]he 
Supreme Court . . . made clear in Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. [that] more than a disparity in 
bargaining power is needed in order to show that an 
arbitration agreement was not entered into willingly.”  Great 
W. Mortg. Corp. v. Peacock, 110 F.3d 222, 229 (3d Cir. 
1997).  Parties frequently possess varying degrees of 
bargaining power, and there is a “range of ordinary and 
acceptable bargaining situations[.]”  Salley, 925 A.2d at 120 
n.3.  Our role is to distinguish acceptable bargaining 
situations from those which violate “strong public policy[.]”  
Id. 
 Factors we must consider in determining whether the 
contract rises to the level of procedural unconscionability 
include:  “the take-it-or-leave-it nature of the standardized 
form of the document[,]” “the parties’ relative bargaining 
positions,” and “the degree of economic compulsion 
motivating the ‘adhering’ party[.]”  Salley, 925 A.2d at 125 
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(quoting Delta Funding Corp. v. Harris, 912 A.2d 104, 111 
(N.J. 2006)). 
 In Zimmer v. CooperNeff Advisors, Inc., we considered 
the plaintiff’s educational background and “the context in 
which the ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ ultimatum was issued” in 
determining that the contract did not rise to the level of 
procedural unconscionability.  523 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 
2008).  Zimmer was a highly educated economist and 
willingly accepted an offer of employment, knowing that the 
formal employment agreement had not yet been finalized, and 
further, he did not allege that he lacked an opportunity to 
negotiate.  Id.; see also Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32-33 (no 
procedural unconscionability where experienced businessman 
was neither coerced nor defrauded when he complied with his 
employer’s requirement that he register – and sign an 
included arbitration agreement – with the New York Stock 
Exchange). 
 Similarly, in Great Western Mortg. Corp. v. Peacock, 
the appellant argued that she accepted the arbitration 
agreement “only because she was the weaker of the two 
parties to the employment contract.”  Peacock, 110 F.3d at 
229.  Peacock was undoubtedly the weaker party.  Id.  
Additionally, her employer notified her that she would be 
required to sign an agreement to arbitrate upon beginning her 
employment, but she did not sign the actual arbitration 
agreement until several weeks after she began working.  Id. at 
224, 228.  Nevertheless, we found that the agreement was not 
procedurally unconscionable because Peacock agreed to 
arbitration on three different occasions, she was a college 
graduate with a Business Administration degree, and she did 
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not contend that she failed to read the document containing 
the arbitration agreement, or that she was coerced into signing 
it.  Id. at 228-30. 
 At the other end of the spectrum, we found procedural 
unconscionability in an employment agreement where the 
employee, though college educated, was told to read and sign 
an employment contract, and was dependent on the employer, 
one of the world’s largest jewelry retailers, for his 
immigration status and his “very capacity to work in St. 
Thomas[.]”  Nino, 609 F.3d at 196-97, 202.  Similarly, we 
held unconscionable an arbitration agreement between a 
multi-national business and minimally-educated crane 
operators.  Alexander, 341 F.3d at 266.6
 Quilloin’s situation is nothing like that of the plaintiffs 
in Nino or Alexander v. Anthony Intern., L.P.  The District 
Court acknowledged that Tenet had less bargaining power 
than the multinational corporations in both of those cases.  
More importantly, Quilloin was neither a minimally-educated 
crane operator as were the plaintiffs in Alexander, nor 
 
                                              
6 Although Great Western Mortgage Corp. v. Peacock, 
Nino v. Jewelry Exchange, Inc., and Alexander v. Anthony 
Intern., L.P., apply New Jersey and Virgin Islands law, the 
cases provide useful reference points because the  principles 
of procedural unconscionability are substantially similar 
under the laws of those jurisdictions.  See Salley, 925 A.2d at 
125 (drawing procedural unconscionability principles from 
New Jersey law); Zimmer, 523 F.3d at 228-29 (analogizing to 
case applying Virgin Islands law). 
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dependent on her employer for her immigration status as was 
the plaintiff in Nino. 
 Although Quilloin did not possess the same level of 
education or specialized skills as the plaintiff in Zimmer, her 
situation appears to be much like the plaintiff’s situation in 
Peacock.  Like Peacock, Quilloin argues that she was in an 
unequal bargaining position because she was just an 
employee signing a form agreement.  Like Peacock, Quilloin 
might not have seen or signed the actual arbitration agreement 
until after beginning her employment.  As in Peacock, we 
acknowledge that the employee is the weaker party to the 
agreement, Peacock, 110 F.3d at 229; however, like Peacock, 
Quilloin did not lack a meaningful choice.  She had a college 
degree, and chose to agree to the arbitration agreement on 
more than one occasion.  Even if she was not initially 
informed of the agreement at either time she was hired, the 
fact remains that she quit her employment at Tenet to work 
for another employer, and then chose to go back and work 
once again for Tenet, subject to the Employment Agreement 
and the FTP.  When Quilloin went back to her job at Tenet, 
the question of whether she actually remembered the 
arbitration agreement is of no consequence; we must presume 
that she was rehired knowing about the arbitration agreement 
which she had already signed, because parties are presumed 
to have knowledge of contracts they have signed.  See, e.g., 
Morales v. Sun Constr., Inc., 541 F.3d 218, 221-22 (3d Cir. 
2008); Denlinger, 608 A.2d at 1069-70. 
 Under such circumstances, we reject Quilloin’s 
argument that there was unfair surprise or a lack of time to 
consider or learn the meaning of the terms of the agreement.  
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We find that Quilloin did not lack a meaningful choice in 
agreeing to arbitrate, and she thus raised no genuine dispute 
of material fact with regard to procedural unconscionability. 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the District 
Court erred in denying Tenet’s motion to compel arbitration.  
We will therefore reverse the order of the District Court and 
remand with instructions to stay litigation proceedings and 
compel arbitration. 
